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BRUTON DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE IN CASES
INVOLVING INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS-
PARKER V. RANDOLPH
The Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let
Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face,
and I have done.
-Sir Walter Raleigh*
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment' was adopted to prevent
the use of ex parte affidavits and depositions in lieu of available witnesses in
criminal trials. 2 The clause affords defendants the opportunity to face their
accusers, and allows the judge and jury to view the witness' demeanor to aid
them in determining the reliability of the testimony. 3 In the landmark de-
* 2 HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 15-16 (London 1816). Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh had been charged with endorsing a treasonous plot to replace King James with Lady
Arabella Stuart. The prosecution relied primarily on depositions and letters by Lord Cobham,
Raleigh's alleged co-conspirator. Knowing that Cobham's confessions had probably been ex-
tracted through coercion and that Cobham had since retracted the confessions, Raleigh re-
peatedly demanded the opportunity to face his accuser and cross-examine him. The judges
refused to force the prosecution to produce Cobham, relying on the principle that "so many
horsestealers may escape, if they may not be condemned without witnesses." Id. at 18. Raleigh
was convicted on November 17, 1603, and subsequently beheaded. See also W.O. DOUGLAS.
AN. ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 144 (1954).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense (emphasis added).
2. The Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895), stated that:
"The primary objective of the constitutional provision in question [the sixth amendment] was to
prevent depositions of ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being
used against the prisoner in lieu of personal examination and cross-examination .. ." See also
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968) (reversed armed robbery conviction where trans-
script of accomplice's confession was read at defendant's trial and state did not make good faith
effort to produce accomplice); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (reversed convic-
tion for murder where extrajudicial confession of accomplice was read before jury and defendant
unable to confront accomplice through cross-examination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
406-09 (1965) (reversed robbery conviction because defendant was denied the opportunity to
confront an adverse witness when deposition of major witness was used by prosecution at de-
fendant's trial).
3. The Mattox Court also stated that the objective of the sixth amendment was to secure
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compel-
ling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, -and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his tes-
timony whether he is worthy of belief.
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cision of Bruton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court ex-
panded that prevailing interpretation of the confrontation clause by holding
that a defendant's confrontation rights are violated when a non-testifying
codefendant's incriminating confession is introduced at a joint trial. I The
Court found that the violation exists because there is a substantial risk that
the jury will disregard a judge's limiting instructions6 and consider the ex-
trajudicial confession of one conspirator when determining the guilt of a co-
conspirator. 7
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395
(Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. See also Davenport, The Confrontation
Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1378 (1972). For a good discussion and analysis of the history and development
of the sixth amendment see F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES; A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1969); Clark, Sixth
Amendment and the Law of the Land, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1963).
The right to confront one's accusers has since been expanded to include the right to cross-
examine. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (clause guarantees cross-examination of ad-
verse witness for bias); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask adverse
witness his name is denial of cross-examination as guaranteed by confrontation clause);
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (denial of cross-examination, without waiver, is constitu-
tional error of the first magnitude); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation clause,
which includes the right to cross-examine, applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment). See also WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 123 as follows:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the
opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation not for the
idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the
purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal
putting of questions and obtaining answers (emphasis in original).
4. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
5. Id. at 124. The joint trial for armed postal robbery resulted in the conviction of
codefendants Bruton and Evans. Although neither defendant took the stand at trial, a postal
inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed to committing the robbery with Bruton, his
accomplice. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard Evans' confession for purposes of
determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. Id. The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction
stating that his confrontation rights had been violated because he was unable to cross-examine
his codefendant concerning the incriminating confession which had been presented to the jury.
Id. at 126.
6. The limiting instructions in Bruton included the following:
A confession made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered as
evidence against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way a party to
the confession. Therefore, if you find that a confession was in fact voluntary and
intentionally made by the defendant Evans, you should consider it as evidence in
the case against Evans, but you must not consider it, and should disregard it, in
considering the evidence in the case against the defendant Bruton.
Id. at 125 n.2.
7. Id. at 135-36. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that:
[Als was recognized in Jackson v. Denno [378 U.S. 368 (1964)] there are some
contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so
great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical
and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. [Cases omitted]. Such
a context is presented here where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial state-
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In a recent decision, however, a plurality of the Supreme Court limited
the application of the Bruton doctrine 8 to situations in which the complain-
ing defendant has not confessed. In Parker v. Randolph, 9 the Court held
that when a complaining defendant has made a confession which "inter-
locks" 10 with the extrajudicial confessions of his or her codefendants, the
admission of the non-testifying codefendants' confessions does not Violate the
Bruton rule. 11 The Court reasoned that once a defendant's own confession
is properly before the jury, the prejudicial impact of a codefendant's in-
criminating confession is minimal and that Bruton, therefore, is inapplica-
ble. 12
ments of a codefendant, who stands side-by-side with the defendant, are deliber-
ately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastat-
ing to the defendant, but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized
when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their tes-
timony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift blame onto others. The
unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged ac-
complice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It
was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.
Id.
For further support of this proposition see Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1947); United
States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1966); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007
(2d Cir. 1932). See also E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 105 (1956); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Although there is no certified official version of the "Bruton rule," the doctrine seems to
be that the introduction at a joint trial of a non-testifying defendant's extrajudicial confession,
which inculpates a codefendant, violates the codefendant's right of confrontation as guaranteed
by the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 943 (1970).
9. 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
10. The term "interlocking confessions" originated in Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970), in which, prior to their joint trial, both
defendants made similar admissions which supported and interlocked with one another. Al-
though there is no precise definition of what makes confessions interlock, the confessions appar-
ently need not be absolutely identical in order to be termed "interlocking." All that is required
is that the confessions be substantially similar and consistent concerning the major elements of
the crime. See, e.g., Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 872 (1975) (confessions interlock in manslaughter conviction despite discrepancies as to
whether codefendant knew his accomplice was armed); Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.
1973) (confessions did not cover same facts and were considerably dissimilar as to time of com-
mission of murder but were essentially similar regarding motive, plot, and execution); Duff v.
Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972) (admissions inter-
lock despite inconsistencies regarding use of automobile because motive and presence at scene
of crime were consistent).
See note 38 infra for the confessions deemed interlocking in Parker.
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2135 (1979).
12. Id. at 2140. The Court found that when the confessing codefendant has not taken the
stand and the other codefendant has maintained his innocence from the start, there is a viola-
tion of the confrontation clause. The Court, however, held that:
[Wihen the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we believe the
constitutional scales tip the other way. The possible prejudice resulting from the
11631979]
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This Note first will trace the history and development of the Bruton doc-
trine and then will analyze the Parker Court's attempt to reconcile its hold-
ing with that doctrine. Further, this Note will criticize the Court's analysis
and assess the probable impact of Parker in future Bruton situations.
EVOLUTION OF THE BRUTON DOCTRINE
In Bruton and Parker, the Court addressed the problem which arises at a
joint trial when a non-testifying defendant has made an extrajudicial con-
fession that inculpates his or her codefendant. Clearly the confession is
admissible against the confessor.' 3 It is equally clear, however, that the
confession may not be used as evidence of the codefendant's guilt.' 4 The
problem, therefore, is how to use the admission against the confessor with-
out prejudicing his or her codefendant. Before Bruton, courts seemingly solved
this problem by allowing the confession into evidence and carefully in-
structing the jury that the confession was only admissible against its maker
and could not be used as evidence of the codefendant's guilt. 15 In Delli
failure of the jury to follow the court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital"
to the confessing defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing
admission of evidence with limiting instructions.
Id. at 2140.
13. An extrajudicial confession is admissible against one who made it as an exception to the
hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), which provides in pertinent part: "A statement is
not hearsay if ... [tihe statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in
either his individual or a representative capacity .... " See also 4, J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1048 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); E. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85
U. PA. L. REv. 484 (1937). For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the hearsay
rule and the confrontation clause, see generally D. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and
the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HAsv. L.
REV. 1378.(1972); Comment, The Uncertain Relationship Between the Hearsay Rule and the
Confrontation Clause, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1167 (1974).
14. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617-19 (1953) (post-conspiracy declarations
of one co-conspirator only admissible against the declarant); Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 444 (1949) (out-of-court statement not made in furtherance of a conspiracy by a co-
conspirator inadmissible against non-declarant co-conspirator); Blumenthal v. United States, 332
U.S. 539, 551-52 (1947) (declarations of one conspirator made after conspiracy terminated in-
admissible as evidence of co-conspirator's guilt).
15. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, '242-43 (1957) (held reasonable to assume
that juries are capable of disregarding the incriminating evidence); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 177-79 (1953). (approved jury instructions as a means of preserving a codefendant's confron-
tation rights). For the proposition that the whole theory of trial relies on the presumed ability of
juries to follow instructions see Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615-20 (1953); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 552-53
(1947).
Some courts have employed redaction, whereby all references to the non-declarant codefend-
ant were deleted. See, e.g., Kramer v. United States, 317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(deletion of hearsay reference to codefendant is preferable to jury instruction); United States v.
Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574, 576 (3d Cir. 1960) (deletion of hearsay reference required where it
adds new and damaging information about codefendant which is not corroborated by other pros-
1164 [Vol. 28:1161
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Paoli v. United States,16 the Supreme Court gave its sanction to that method
when it held that it was reasonable to assume that a jury would be able to
follow a judge's instructions and disregard the apparently reliable incriminat-
ing confession when gauging a non-confessing defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. 17
Seven years after Delli Paoli, in Jackson v. Denno, 18 the Court effectively
repudiated the Delli Paoli presumption. 19 The Court held that the admissi-
bility of a confession should be determined by a trial judge prior to its sub-
mission to the jury because a jury cannot be expected to disregard a confes-
sion if it is subsequently deemed inadmissible. 20 The presumption that
juries are able to ignore incriminating evidence was dealt a further blow in
Douglas v. Alabama. 21 In that case, a co-conspirator who had been found
guilty in a separate trial was called as a witness in Douglas' trial. The Court
found that Douglas' inability to cross-examine his accomplice, whose ex-
trajudicial confession had implicated Douglas and had been read before the
jury, violated Douglas' sixth amendment right of confrontation. 22
ecution evidence); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529-30, 407 P.2d 265, 272-73, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 353, 360-61 (1965) (joint trial permitted if all parts of confession which implicate codefend-
ant are omitted).
Redaction, however, has been vigorously criticized because a juror can easily conclude at a
joint trial that "Blank" or "Mr. X" refers to the declarant's codefendant. See Jones v. United
States, 342 F.2d 863, 866-67 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962, 969
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 923 (1965); People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y.2d 360, 363,
206 N.E.2d 864, 865 (1965). See also Hendricks, The Right of Confrontation and the Use of
Nontestifying Codefendant's Confessions: Constitutional Law in a Microcosm, 26 U. MIAMI L.
Riv. 755, 758 (1972); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAsv. L. REv. 920,
990 (1959); 35 Mo. L. REv. 125, 127-28 (1970).
In both Bruton and Parker the Supreme Court mentioned but did not rule on whether
redaction was a satisfactory protection of the non-declarant. During oral argument in Parker,
however, the Assistant Tennessee Attorney General conceded that the redaction performed was
insufficient and by no means a proper substitute for cross-examination. 25, CuM. L. REP. (BNA)
4005, 4006 (1979). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, hinted that perhaps
redaction was not a very effective means of concealing the identity of-the non-declarant. 99 S.
Ct. at 2136 n.3.
16. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
17. Id. at 241-43. The Court noted that:
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the law to the jury and
that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds them. Unless we proceed
on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where those instruc-
tions are clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be ex-
pected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense.
Id. at 242.
18. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
19. Id. at 388.
20. Id.
21. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
22. Id. at 419-20. The Court stated:
In the circumstances of this case, petitioner's inability to cross-examine Loyd as
to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured
by the Confrontation Clause .... Although the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged
statement, and Loyd's refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the So-
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Finally, in Bruton, the Court expressly overruled Delli Paoli and stated
that it could no longer accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute
for cross-examination of an adverse witness. 23 It noted that the practical
effect was "the same as if there had been no [limiting] instruction at all."24
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan further justified the decision by
referring to the 1966 amendment of Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure which authorizes a severance where it appears that a defend-
ant may be prejudiced by a joint trial.2 5  Justice Brennan suggested that
severance is an alternate means of achieving the benefit of using a confession
against its maker without unduly prejudicing his or her codefendant 26
Since Bruton, the courts have been flooded with cases requiring interpre-
tation of the Bruton doctrine. 27 Although most of those cases have pro-
duced uniform interpretations of how and when the Bruton doctrine is to be
applied, 28 the courts rarely have agreed on how to apply Bruton when, as in
licitor's reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony
that, Loyd in fact made the statement; and Loyd's reliance upon the privilege [to
not incriminate himself] created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer
both that the statement had been made and that it was true.
Id. at 419.
23. 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 131. Quoting the Advisory Committee on Rules, the Court found:
A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence against a co-
defendant of a statement or confession made by that co-defendant. This prejudice
cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the co-defendant does not take the
stand. Limiting instructions to the jury may not in fact erase the prejudice ...
The purpose of the amendment is to provide a procedure whereby the issue of
possible prejudice can be resolved on the motion for severance.
Id. at 132, quoting 34 F.R.D. 419.
26. Id. at 132-34. For some additional arguments against prejudicing a codefendant for the
sake of judicial economy see People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 526, 407 P.2d 265, 270, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 353, 358 (1965), and People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 428-33, 164 N.E. 336, 339-41 (1928)
(Lehman, J., dissenting).
27. See Note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States:
The Questions and a Proposal for Their Resolution, 1970 DUKE L.J. 329, 339 [hereinafter cited
as DUKE Note].
28. It is generally agreed that in order for Bruton to apply, there must first be a confession
which inculpates the complaining defendant. See United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069,
1080-81 (2d Cir. 1969) (Bruton rule inapplicable when confessor's statement in no way impli-
cates codefendants); United States v. Weston, 417 F.2d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (no Bruton violation when a confessor only implicates himself); White v.
United States, 415 F.2d 292, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 993 (1970) (confron-
tation rights not denied when confessor's statement does not implicate codefendant). Addition-
ally, the courts generally agree that the complaining defendant must have been denied an op-
portunity to cross-examine the confessing codefendant. See also Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622,
629-30 (1971) (Bruton right of confrontation is satisfied when the confessor takes the stand and is
available for cross-examination); United States v. Sims, 434 F.2d 258, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1970) (no
denial of confrontation where declarant took stand and was available for cross-examination);
United States.v. Bujese, 434 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1970) (where
1166
1979] PARKER V. RANDOLPH 1167
Parker, all the codefendants have made extrajudicial confessions. Some
courts have held simply that Bruton does not apply to situations involving
interlocking confessions. 29 Others have held that Bruton applies regardless
of the existence of interlocking confessions. 30 Still others have ruled on a
case by case basis that, although Bruton applies, the admission of interlock-
confessor takes stand and denies making confession and is available for cross-examination his
codefendant's right of confrontation is satisfied); McHenry v. United States, 420 F.2d 927, 928
(10th Cir. 1970) (right of confrontation satisfied when declarant testifies at trial); United States v.
Ballentine, 410 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1969) (right of confrontation satisfied where declarant
defendant was cross-examined by codefendant's counsel); Davis v. State, 445 S.W.2d 933,
939-41 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (where codefendants freely testify at joint trial, admission of
codefendant's confession implicating defendant does not violate confrontation rights of defend-
ant). But see West v. Henderson, 409 F.2d 95, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1969) (confrontation right
denied despite fact that confessor testified); In re Whitehorn, 1 Cal. 3d 504, 510-13, 462 P.2d
361, 364-66, 82 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612-14 (1969) (admission of codefendant's extrajudicial confession
is sixth amendment error despite fact that confessor testified and was available for cross-
examination); In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 1009-13, 458 P.2d 449, 457-60, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537,
545-48 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970) (defendant's right of confrontation denied even
though confessing codefendant takes stand).
Some courts have interpreted this right to cross-examination to be the right to effective
cross-examination. See Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1968) (right to
effective cross-examination not fulfilled if declarant takes the stand but denies making the
statement); Goodwin v. Page, 296 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (E.D. Okla. 1969) (Bruton doctrine
applies even when declarant takes stand if he pleads the fifth amendment after being read his
confession); State v. Coleman, 9 Ariz. App. 526, 528, 454 P.2d 196, 198 (1969) (right to effective
cross-examination is denied if both codefendants are represented by the same attorney).
Additionally, there is a general consensus that the rule is inapplicable in bench trials. See,
e.g., Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1969); Brown v. State, 252 So. 2d
842, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Brown v. State, 223 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969). Most courts also agree that the rule is inapplicable when the codefendants have made
statements prior to the termination of the conspiracy. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80-81
(1970); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 215-17 (1946); Clune v. United States, 159 U.S.
590, 593-95 (1895); McGregor v. United States, 422 F.2d 925, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1970); Parness v.
United States, 415 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1969). See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) which states as
follows:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is
(E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furth-
erance of the conspiracy.
See also 4 J. WiMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1079 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
29. See, e.g., Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 872 (1975); Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972); Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 10 supra for the
definition of interlocking confessions.
30. See, e.g., Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1181-84 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979); Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 1978); Johnson
v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969).
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ing confessions constitutes "harmless error." 3 l It was against this backdrop
of conflicting lower court interpretations of the Bruton rule that the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari3 2 to determine whether or not Bruton
applied to situations involving interlocking confessions.
33
PARKER'S FACTS AND REASONING
In Parker, respondents Hamilton, Pickens, and Randolph aided Joe and
Robert Wood in a robbery3 4 that resulted in a murder. 35 After they were
31. See, e.g., Hall v. Wolff, 539 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (8th Cir.*1976); United States v, Di-
Gilio, 538 F.2d 972, 981-83 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Glinsey v.
Parker, 491 F.2d 337, 340-44 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); United States
v. Brown, 452 F.2d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Ignacio v, Guam, 413
F.2d 513, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970).
32. Parker v. Randolph, 439 U.S. 978 (1978).
33. 99 S. Ct. at 2137.
34. Id. at 2135. In June of 1970, Las Vegas gambler William Douglas, alias Ray Blaylock,
arrived in Memphis packing a .38 caliber pistol and a marked deck of cards. He contacted
Walter Lee (Woppy) Gaddy who subsequently arranged a poker game between Mr. Douglas
and Robert Wood, a local Memphis gambler. In return for making the "set up" and for the use
of his apartment, Gaddy was to receive a cut of the winnings.
During the course of the initial contest between Wood and Douglas, Wood was relieved of
nearly $2,000. A week later a second game produced similar results. Appendix to Briefs for
Respondents and Petitioner, Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979) thereinafter cited as
Appendix].
By this time, Wood had grown suspicious of Douglas' good fortune and brought Tommy
Thomas, another Memphis gambler, with him to the third game to determine if and how Doug-
las was cheating. Unbeknownst to Wood, however, Tommy Thomas was the son of renowned
professional gambler "Titanic Thomas" a longtime friend of Douglas. Appendix, supra at 217.
After Wood suffered his third loss Thomas predictably reported to Wood that the game was
"clean."
Still convinced that Douglas was somehow cheating, Robert Wood met with his brother, Joe
Wood, and the two men schemed to separate Douglas from his ill-gotten gains by staging a
"holdup" of the upcoming fourth game. To execute the staged robbery, Joe Wood enlisted
Isaiah Hamilton, one of his employees, who in turn recruited James Randolph and Wilbur
Pickens.
On the night of July 6, 1970, the fourth game between Robert Wood and Douglas began with
Joe Wood and Thomas present as spectators. At approximately 8:45 p.m., Joe Wood left fo go
out and get some beer. Appendix, supra at 217. After making the purchase he met Pickens,
Randolph, and Hamilton and they all approached the apartment. When Douglas heard the noise
of several people returning, he became suspicious and positioned himself behind the door
armed with his .38 and a shotgun. After Douglas repeatedly inquired as to who was at the door,
during which time respondents Hamilton, Randolph, and Pickens went back out to their car,
Joe Wood convinced Douglas that he was alone and was admitted into the apartment. As a
precautionary measure Douglas had Wood enter the apartment through a small window. The
game was resumed and after a few minutes Joe Wood went into the bathroom. He emerged
from the bathroom brandishing a derringer pistol and ordered Thomas and Douglas to lie on the
floor. Handing the derringer to his brother, Joe Wood left the apartment to call the respon-
dents. Suddenly, Douglas reached for the .38 pistol tucked in his waistband whereupon Robert
Wood wheeled and shot Douglas with his brother's derringer. Appendix, supra at 217. Within
seconds the three respondents returned with Joe Wood and burst into the room. 99 S. Ct. at
2135. The money was taken from the table and everyone left except Thomas, who remained
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apprehended, the respondents and Robert Wood all made separate confes-
sions. 36 Subsequently, the respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly
tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial,
none of the respondents took the stand. .7 Although Joe Wood identified
Hamilton as one of the men recruited to help stage the robbery, the other
two men could not be positively identified. Therefore, the state's case
against the respondents rested primarily on their confessions, 38 introduced
behind to attend the dying Douglas. Appendix, supra at 232. Upon their apprehension by the
police, the respondents confessed to their part in the crime. 99 S. Ct. at 2135.
35. Respondents were charged with murder in the perpetration of a robbery under TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2402 which reads in pertinent part that: "An individual commits murder in the
first degree if: . . . . (4) he commits a willful, deliberate and malicious killing or murder during
the perpetration of any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or
unlawful throwing, placing or discharge of a destructive device or bomb." (Emphasis added).
Tennessee court consistently have held that a killing is first degree murder if done in the
commission of a robbery regardless of whether malice or premeditation is proven. See Philipps
v. State, 455 S.W.2d 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (no need to prove malice or premeditation
where killing done during the commission of a robbery); Smith v. State, 209 Tenn. 499, 354
S.W.2d 450 (1961) (killing during a robbery is murder in the first degree despite casual or
unintentional nature of the killing); Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S.W.2d 843 (1932)
(killing of a police officer in order to effect escape from scene of crime is first degree murder).
Wharton defines the concept of imputed malice as the felony-murder rule as follows: "A
murder committed in the course of the perpetration of a felony is murder on the theory that the
element of malice may be implied from the fact of the commission of a felony, even though the
killing is unintentional and accidental." 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRiMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE § 251 (1957).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2135.
37. Id. at 2136.
38. Id. The following confessions were introduced through the oral testimony of police de-
tectives:
Testimony of Detective Lewis Regarding Oral Statement of Isaiah Hamilton:
He stated that he worked on Summer Avenue and that a man there told him that
another party had been playing poker with a man and that this man had been
cheating him and taking his money. He stated that this party showed him where
they were playing poker, that Monday afternoon, at some apartments over on Win-
chester just west of Airways. He told him to find two other parties and to meet him
at the apartments at approximately 9:00. He drove over to the apartments on that
day, Monday, got there a little early and circled around the lot and parked the car
close to the apartments. He was joined a little bit later by this party. . . . They
were following this man back to the apartment at which time they got back to the
apartment and someone looked out the window and asked who is with you. They
asked this several times. At this time, Isaiah and the other parties went around to
the side of the building and returned to where they had the car parked. Just
shortly, this party came out to the car and told them to come on quick and follow
him, that he had them lying on the floor. At this time they got out of the car and
followed this party back to the apartments and were going inside. Before they did,
they heard a shot come from the inside of the apartment at which time they tried to
go in, found that the door was locked and began kicking on the door. The door was
kicked open at which time they saw a white man lying on the floor on his back ....
There was another party behind, beside a closet door behind the front door of the
apartment. At this time they turned and ran back to the car and returned to Isaiah
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Hamilton's apartment on Haynes at which time they were met by two other parties
who gave them some guns at which time Isaiah Hamilton hid them in his attic....
Appendix, supra note 34, at 161-62.
Testimony of Detective Lewis Regarding Oral Statement of James Randolph
James Randolph stated that on Monday, July 6, 1970 that he was at his home on
Seller with another party at approximately 7:00 p.m. He stated that another party
came to his home and that this party was in a '67 GTO Pontiac convertible and that
this party tried to get him to go with him. Shortly after this party arrived, another
party arrived in a maroon Plymouth. The party in the GTO convertible had told
him that there was another party at some apartments on Winchester playing cards
with another party and that this party was cheating this other party in the card
game and taking his money. He stated that he wanted him to go to this apartment
and stop the man from cheating and get the money back that had been taken and
that the money was going to be taken even if he had to kill this man. He stated
that, he told another party where the apartments were. James Randolph stated that
he and two other parties went to the apartments on Winchester and upon arriving,
another party came out of the apartment and got into the car with-them and they
went to the store and bought a six-pack of beer. When they returned, they went to
the apartment and for some reason, the other party had to go into the apartment
through a window. Shortly later they were joined by this party who came from the
apartment and told them to follow him. They went back to the apartment, attemp-
ted to go in at which time they found the door to the apartment locked. They then
heard a shot come from the inside of the apartment at which time this other party
kicked the front door open and saw a man lying on the floor. There was also
another party that came from behind the front door out of a closet and saw another
party standing in there waving a pistol. . . .They then ran from the apartment and
got into the '67 GTO convertible and went to another party's apartment at which
time they were shortly joined by two other parties who gave them $50 a piece and
also gave them some guns which were hid in another party's attic. James Randolph
stated that he had a .38, another party had a .38 and another party had a saw off
[sic] shotgun. He also stated that $1300 was taken from the apartment .....
Appendix, supra note 34, at 163-64.
Redacted Statement of Pickens, Read During Testimony of Detective Straton:
We went to this apartment on Winchester where the shooting happened. When we
got to the apartment a guy came out and said he was going to get some beer. So,
he told us to trail him up to the Krystal behind his car. It's on Winchester and we
got in his car after we got to the Krystal. . . .We went back to the apartment and
parked out there in the parking lot. One guy got out and went to the front door.
.... Someone said, cause I couldn't see inside, "Do you have someone with you?"
He told them no, he didn't have anybody. Then the person said, "Yes, you is
because I saw them" and then we went back to the car. We went back to the car
and we sat in the car. Then we got back to the car someone let the guy and the dog
in through the window. . . .Then about five minutes later the guy came around to
the side of the apartment and said, "Come here two of you all" and then the other
guys jumped out of the front seat of the car and he told them, "I think they are
going to hurt a fellow." We all jumped out of the car. One guy had a sawed off
shotgun. One had a pistol. I think it was a .22. I had a .38 revolver. We all ran to
the door. Just before we got to the door we heard a shot inside the apartment. One
guy tried to kick the door down, but he couldn't. So the other three guys kicked
the door down. I went in last. I looked and saw a man lying on the floor on his
back. There was another man standing there with a .22 Daringer [sic] and he
turned around and was pointing it towards the door and I was standing in the door.
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through police testimony. 31 The case was appealed through the Tennessee
state courts. a0 The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
Q: What was your purpose for being at 3403 Benbow Drive, Apartment No. I on
the night of July 6, 1970?
A: A guy had left word with another guy for three of us to meet him there at 9:00
that night. A guy had planned for us to-I'll put it like this, to rob the poker game.
Q: When were these plans made and who was supposed to be in on the plans?
A: It was about a week and a half before Monday, July the 6th. A guy had asked
two of us about sticking up him and another guy in order to rob this other man that
was going to be in the game. One guy was supposed to come out the door at
9:00 the night of the game and we were supposed to be there. We were supposed
to come on in and hold the game up, but we was parked in the lot and we wasn't
there. A guy came to the car and asked us what happened and we told him we
didn't know whether or not to bother the game or not. When the guy first talked to
us about robbing the poker game he brought two of us by the apartment on Win-
chester and showed us which one it was. We was in a blue '67 Chevrolet. We
didn't go back there any more until the night of the shooting.
Appendix, supra note 34, at 172-75.
39. Seeking to avoid prejudice to the other defendants, the court and all counsel subjected
each of the confessions to the process of redaction whereby any reference to the other codefen-
dants was replaced by "another party" or "another guy." Appendix, supra note 34, at 233. As
noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the confessions were such "as to leave no
possible doubt in the juror's minds concerning the persons referred to." Randolph v. Parker,
575 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part and revd in part, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979). See
note 15 supra for a discussion of redaction as a means of avoiding prejudice to a statement
maker's codefendants.
Respondent Pickens' confession was admitted into evidence despite objections that it had
been obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For the circumstances
surrounding Pickens' confession see note 42 infra.
40. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendants' convictions finding
that, under Bruton, their sixth amendment right of confrontation had been violated. Appendix,
supra note 34, at 218-19. (The opinion of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, filed on
June 5, 1974, is unreported but is contained within the Appendix at pages 215-26). The court
found that the mere omission of names was not sufficient to avoid prejudice. Quoting Judge
Dwyer, in White v. State, 497 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973), the court stated:
To assume, as urged here by the state, that the insertion of "the other person"
cured any possible prejudice to Johnson would be legal sophistry. Or as Justice
Learned Hand states, it would be a "mental gymnastic which is beyond not only
their (the jurors') powers, but anybody elses'." See Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d
1006, 1007 (2nd Cir. 1932). We have stated before that a statement of the confes-
sing codefendant could be used only if completely stripped of any incriminating
references to the non-confessor. See Taylor v. State, Tenn. Cr. App., 493 S.W.2d
477. In this context the insertion of "the other person" does not meet that test. See
Serio v. United States, 131 U.S. App. D.C. 38, 401 F.2d 989, 990.
Appendix, supra n6te 34, at 219.
Reversal was also predicated on the court's interpretation of the felony-murder rule. Finding
that the evidence did not indicate that the killing was part of or in perpetration of the robbery,
the court stated:
To the contrary, the evidence reflects that Robert Wood shot the deceased prior to
the taking of the money from the apartment. The testimony of State's witness
Tommy Thomas supports Robert Wood's statement that he shot Douglas as the
latter was going for his gun. There is no evidence offered by the prosecution which
supports the theory that Robert Wood was participating in the robbery of William
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granted the respondents' writs of habeas corpus 4 1 and reversed the convic-
tions finding a Bruton violation. 42 The sixth circuit affirmed3 and the Su-
Douglas at the time he shot Douglas. Even the confessions of codefendants Ran-
dolph, Hamilton and Pickens, support the conclusion that the shooting was not part
of a robbery attempt.
Appendix, supra note 34, at 218.
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the court of criminal appeals, holding that the Bru-
ton rule does not apply to situations where all the jointly-tried defendants have confessed.
Appendix, supra note 34, at 246. (The opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed on
December 15, 1975, is unreported but is contained within the Appendix at pages 227-46). The
court noted that this exception to the Bruton rule had been carved out by the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals in O'Neil v. State, 455 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (where all
codefendants make intertwining confessions, jury is presumed to be able to follow judge's in-
structions). ONeil served as direct precedent on this point in State v. Elliot, 524 S.W.2d 473
(Tenn. 1975) (Bruton inapplicable where evidence of codefendant's guilt is so overwhelming),
and Briggs v. State, 501 S.W.2d 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973) (no Bruton violation where all
codefendants confess to murder).
The Tennessee Supreme Court also reversed on the felony-murder issue, holding that the
concept of res gestae applied to cases of felony-murder. Appendix, supra note 34, at 234-38.
The court found that the defendants were attempting to commit a robbery during which it was a
foreseeable consequence that someone would be killed and that, therefore, the murderous act of
one co-conspirator was attributed to them all. Appendix, supra note 34, at 238. The court has
applied this concept before to felony-murder cases. In Smith v. State, 209 Tenn. 499, 354
S.W.2d 450 (1961), an armed robber shot and killed a liquor store owner who had drawn a gun
and attempted to fire at the intruder. The court rejected the argument that the murder was
merely collateral to the robbery stating: "We think that unquestionably this killing was done
and is part of the res gestae of the whole acts embracing the robbery. It had a close and
intimate connection with the felony and grew out of the attempt to commit the felony." Id. at
504, 354 S.W.2d at 452. The defendants need not believe that death would result nor must
there be an intent to kill in order for res gestae to apply. All that is required is that death be a
natural and probable consequence or result of the felony. See Dupres v. State, 209 Tenn. 506,
354 S.W.2d 453 (1962).
41. Appendix, supra note 34, at 320. (The case arose as separate petitions styled as James
Randolph v. Chief Harry Parker, Civil C-76-68; Wilburn Pickens v. Chief Harry Parker, Civil
C-76-69; and Isaiah Hamilton v. Chief Harry Parker, Civil C-76-310. The Memorandum Deci-
sion, filed on May 2, 1977, is unreported but contained within the Appendix at pages 215-26).
42. The court rejected the state's theory that "interlocking confessions" made Bruton au-
tomatically inapplicable and found that, alternatively, the admission of the confessions was not
harmless error. Appendix, supra note 34, at 326. The court also reversed Pickens' conviction
finding that his Miranda rights had been violated. Appendix, supra note 34, at 324. The court
noted that the night prior to his arrest, Pickens saw his picture in a newspaper which stated he
was wanted for Douglas' murder. He called his lawyer, Anthony Sabella, (who had already seen
the picture and story) and asked him to accompany him to the police station. Sabella said he
could not go with him that evening but that Pickens should come to his office in the morning
whereupon they would go to the police. He advised Pickens that if he was arrested, he should
immediately call Sabella. A few hours later Pickens was arrested and subsequently signed a
confession. Pickens claimed he had been physically abused and denied access to counsel despite
his repeated requests to call Sabella. The court stated:
It seems practically inconceivable to this court that Pickens, who had been in
contact with his lawyer the evening before and had been instructed by his lawyer to
tell the police that he wanted his lawyer present if he were arrested during the
night, would not have mentioned this to the police, when they arrested him a few
hours later and had him in custody. The police, it is true, testified that Pickens did
not ask for or even mention that he had counsel, but the police were testifying
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preme Court granted certiorari. 4a
Following a brief discussion of the evolution and purpose behind the for-
mulation of the Bruton rule, the Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals decision.45  The Court held that the Bruton doctrine is per se inapplica-
ble where the complaining defendant has confessed and his or her confession
interlocks with that of the codefendants'. 46  Writing for the plurality, Justice
Rehnquist stated that since a defendant is already prejudiced by his or her
own confession, 4 7 the additional harm caused by the admission of a codefend-
ant's incriminating confessions is negligible. 48 Justice Rehnquist also
reasoned that once a defendant's confession stands unchallenged before the
jury, the right to cross-examine and even impeach one's confessing codefend-
ant would be of little or no value to the complaining defendant. 49 This is
true, argued Justice Rehnquist, despite the fact that a codefendant's confes-
sion is inevitably suspect and unreliable because of the tendency to shift
blame onto others. 5
Responding to the argument that juries will disregard limiting instruc-
tions, the Court found that the jury system contemplated by the constitution
mandates the presumption that juries follow a court's instructions. 51 The
Court stated that the sixth amendment does not bar every extrajudicial
statement made by a non-testifying declarant simply because it incriminates
the complaining defendant. 52
about, to them, a routine event eighteen months after the event. We are satisfied,
therefore, that this record does not support the finding that Pickens did not ask for
access to his lawyer.
Appendix, supra note 34, at 324.
43. Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in part, 99 S.
Ct. 2132 (1970). The court noted that: "in no instance has the Supreme Court overruled Bruton
or suggested that either identity or greater or lesser similarity of confessions presented by hear-
say and without confrontation served to make them admissible." Id. at 1183.
44. 439 U.S. 978 (1978).
45. Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979). In a 5-3 decision the judgment was affirmed
as to Pickens and reversed as to the other respondents. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plural-
ity, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White. Justice
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2135.
47. Id. at 2139. Quoting liberally from Justice White's dissent in Bruton, Justice Rehnquist
noted that a confession is the most damaging and probative type of evidence that can stand
against a defendant and, since the defendant is "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable
source of information about his past conduct," it is difficult to imagine evidence which would be
more damaging to the defendant. Id., quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 140
(1968) (White, J., dissenting). Curiously, this is the only support cited by the plurality for its
argument that a non-testifying codefendant's confession will not have a "devastating" effect on a
defendant's case.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The Court Further Limits Application of the Bruton Doctrine
Adoption of the Parker rule 53 is the latest attempt by the Court to nar-
rowly define and limit the application of the Bruton doctrine. The first indi-
cation of this trend came in Frazier v. Cupp, 54 in which the Court held that
a denial of confrontation did not require automatic reversal. 55 The pros-
ecutor in Frazier summarized in his opening statement the confession he
expected a codefendant to give. 56 The codefendant, however, did not tes-
tify and the other defendant, Frazier, asserted a Bruton violation. 57 The
Court found that no such error existed when the confession was not entered
into evidence because the jury would be able to successfully segregate the
information. 58
The Court further limited application of the Bruton doctrine in Harlington v.
California,5 9 in which three codefendants made extrajudicial confessions
that were admitted at joint trial. 60 All three of the confessions implicated non-
confessing codefendant Harrington. 61 Only one of the three confessors,
however, took the stand and was available for cross-examination. 62 There-
fore, Harrington insisted that his Bruton rights were violated when he was
denied an opportunity to cross-examine the non-testifying confessors. 63 The
Court admitted that a Bruton violation had occurred but concluded that, in
light of the overwhelming evidence against Harrington, 64 the lack of an op-
portunity to cross-examine his confessing codefendants constituted "harmless
error." 65
53. For the purposes of this Note, the "Parker rule" shall be defined as the per se rule
declaring the Bruton doctrine inapplicable to situations involving interlocking confessions.
54. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
55. id. at 735-36.
56. Id. at 733-34.
57. Id. at 734.
58. Id. at 735. The Court held that the confession had minimal prejudicial impact on the
petitioner because: (1) only a paraphrase of the confession was presented to the jury; (2) the jury
was subsequently instructed not to consider the opening statement as evidence; and (3) the
codefendant's confession was not a substantial element in the case against petitioner Frazier. Id.
59. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
60. Id. at 252. The jury was instructed that each confession was to be considered only
against its maker. Id.
61. Id. at 253. Although two of the confessions did not specifically refer to Harrington by
name, the references to a "white guy" made it as clear as "pointing and shouting that the
person referred to was the white man [Harrington] in the dock with the three Negroes." Id.
62. Id. at 252.
63. id.
64. Several witnesses and the victim had identified Harrington as a participant in the rob-
bery. Additionally, Harrington made a statement identifying one of his codefendants as the
"trigger man" and admitted that he had fled the scene of the crime with his codefendants. He
also stated that he had dyed his hair and shaved his moustache following the murder. Id. at
252-53.
65. The Court's decision was based on its feeling that unless no violation of Bruton could
possibly be harmless, the conviction needed to be affirmed. Id. at 254. The doctrine of harmless
1174
1979] PARKER V. RANDOLPH 1175
The Bruton rule was again diluted in Dutton v. Evans 66 in which the
Court concluded that a Georgia hearsay exception, 67 holding statements
made by one conspirator during the concealment of a crime admissible
against all the conspirators, 68 did not violate the Bruton doctrine. 69 The
Court held that the confrontation clause was not violated because the infer-
ences the jury could draw from the hearsay statement would not have the
devastating consequences contemplated in Bruton. 70
error was first formulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, reh. denied, 386 U.S.
987 (1967), where a prosecutor made lengthy comments about the inferences the jury should
make concerning a defendant's failure to testify. The Court ruled that, under Griffin v. Califor-
nia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which prohibited such comments, this error was not harmless because
it was reasonably possible that the error contributed to the conviction. Chapman v. California,
356 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). The Court specifically declined to state that all federal constitutional
errors could never be harmless. It noted that "some constitutional errors which in the setting of
a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction."
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967), reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).
For a more in-depth look at the development of the harmless error doctrine and its effect on
cases involving confessions see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 814 (1970); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967); Note,
Comment on Application of the Harmless Error Rule to "Confession" Cases, 1968 UTAH L.
REV. 144. For cases applying the harmless error test to situations involving interlocking confes-
sions see note 31 supra.
The Court again applied the harmless error doctrine in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427
(1972), in which both codefendants had confessed to a murder. Id. at 428. The Court bypassed
the denial of confrontation issue and looked to the similarity between the two confessions in
determining that whatever error may have occurred was harmless. Id. at 431. The Court noted
that, in addition to this similarity, the jury would not have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
the state's case any less persuasive if the codefendants' confessions had been excluded. Id. See
also notes 113-15 and accompanying text infra.
66. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
67. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954) provides: "After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved,
the declarations by any one of the conspirators during pendancy of the criminal project shall be
admissible against all."
68. This differs from the federal hearsay conspiracy exception which only admits statements
made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, not statements made during the
period of time when a conspirator attempts to prevent detection and punishment by concealing
the criminal activity. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 616-17 (1953); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444 (1949). See also Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E), 51 F.R.D. 315, 418 (1971).
The Georgia hearsay exception, however, is not unique. See, e.g., Dailey v. State, 233 Ala.
384, 171, So. 729 (1936); Reed v. People, 156 Colo. 450, 402 P.2d 68 (1965); State v. Roberts,
95 Kan. 280, 147 P. 828 (1915). See also 3 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 643, at 338-39
(13th ed. 1955), which supports this interpretation by stating that a subsequent declaration by
one conspirator may be admissible against a coconspirator "if the conspirators were still con-
cerned with the concealment of their criminal conduct or identity .. " ld. at 339.
69. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1970). For a more detailed discussion of Dutton,
see generally 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 727 (1971).
70. At the separate trial of one conspirator, Evans, testimony was presented showing that
Williams, the other conspirator, had stated to his cellmate: "If it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77
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The Parker Rule: An Inconsistent Approach
The Parker rule is inconsistent with the Court's prior treatment of inter-
locking confession cases. Although the Court has never specifically ruled that
Bruton applies regardless of the existence of interlocking confessions, 71 it
previously has identified a Bruton error in cases in which interlocking con-
fessions were admitted into evidence. In Brown v. United States, 72 Ander-
son v. Louisiana, 73 and Hopper v. Louisiana, 74 the Court found Bruton
errors despite the presence of confessions which were corroborative and con-
sistent with one another. 75 Moreover, an analysis of these and other post-
(1970). The Court found that the admission of this statement did not deprive Evans of his right
of confrontation because: (1) the statement was reliable due to its spontaneity and the lack of
motive for the cellmate to lie; (2) Williams had direct knowledge of the murder; and (3) "the
statement contained no express assertion about past fact, and consequently it carried on its face
a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight." Id. at 88.
71. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972), where the Court had the opportunity to
rule on the question of whether or not the Bruton doctrine applied in situations involving
interlocking confessions but declined to do so. The Court held that the doctrine of harmless
error applied to whatever Bruton error may have occurred. See notes 59-65 and accompanying
text supra.
72. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
73. 403 U.S. 949 (1971).
74. 392 U.S. 658 (1968).
75. In Brown, two non-testifying codefendants made incriminating extrajudicial confessions
to transporting stolen goods. These confessions, although not termed interlocking, were substan-
tially similar and consistent regarding the major elements of the crime. Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973). The Court found that the admission of these confessions violated
Bruton. Id. at 231. The Court, however, found that the erroneously admitted confessions were
merely cumulative of other overwhelmingly damaging evidence already before the jury and,
thus, their admission constituted harmless error. Id. In Parker, Justice Rehnquist asserted that
the Brown Court did not pass on the merits of the Bruton claim here because the Solicitor
General had already conceded that a Bruton error had been made. 99 S. Ct. at 2138 n.5, 2140
n.8. A reexamination of the opinion, however, reveals that the Court felt there was indeed a
Bruton error. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Burger observed that:
Upon an independent examination of the record, we agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that the Bruton errors were harmless. The testimony erroneously admitted
was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence
properly before the jury. In this case, as in Harrington v. California [citation omit-
ted] the independent evidence "is so overwhelming that unless we can say that no
violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this ... conviction
undisturbed," id. at 254. We reject the notion that a Bruton error can never be
harmless.
411 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added).
Relying on Bruton, the Anderson Court reversed the convictions of four rape defendants.
Anderson v. Louisiana, 403 U.S. 949 (1971). This application of the Bruton doctrine came de-
spite the fact that the codefendants' confessions were substantially consistent and corroborative.
State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 1129, 229 So. 2d 329, 337 (1969). Similarly, in Hopper, two
codefendants had made confessions which were interlocking and supportive of one another.
State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 103-11, 203 So. 2d 222, 232-34 (1967). On appeal, the Supreme
Court applied the Bruton doctrine and vacated the convictions despite the existence of these
corroborating confessions. Hopper v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 658 (1968). On remand, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that the Bruton violations existed but that they were harmless due to the
[Vol. 28:11611176
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Bruton decisions reveals that the Court has consistently applied Bruton to
cases in which a codefendant's confession inculpates another defendant not-
withstanding the amount of additional incriminating evidence against that
defendant. 76 This has been true even though the defendant has been sub-
stantially incriminated by the evidence and has made incriminating state-
ments which technically fall short of a confession. 77 A further indication
that the Parker per se analysis is a departure from the traditional Bruton
analysis is found in the fact that five of the fourteen cases relied on for the
Court's reasoning in Bruton involved interlocking confessions. 78
Interlocking Confessions
This analytic inconsistency is particularly unsettling because Parker does
not indicate precisely what constitutes an "interlocking confession." 79  As
evidenced by the wide diversity in lower court applications of the interlock-
overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt. 253 La. 439, 218 So. 2d 551 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1969).
In Parker, Justice Rehnquist asserted for the plurality that, since the Court did not pass on
the merits of petitioners' Bruton claim, the Court found no Bruton error in Hopper. 99 S. Ct.
at 2140 n.8.
76. See notes 59-65, 72-75, and accompanying text supra.
77. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293
(1968). In Harrington, the petitioner made a statement identifying the "trigger man," admitted
fleeing the scene of the crime with his codefendants, and admitted shaving off his moustache
and dyeing his hair following the crime. 395 U.S. at 252-53. In Russell, defendant Roberts was
convicted of armed robbery after a joint trial in which a non-testifying codefendant's incriminat-
ing confession was admitted into evidence. 392 U.S. at 293. Roberts' cousin testified that
Roberts had indicated that "he thought Tennessee was an easy place to commit a robbery."
Appendix to Respondent's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, 6,
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). The Court granted certiorari to determine whether its
decision in Bruton was to be applied retroactively, decided that it was, and remanded the case
for consideration in light of Bruton. 392 U.S. at 294-95. See also notes 59-65 and accompanying
text supra.
78. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129-135 nn. 4, 8, & 9 (1968). See Floyd v.
Wilkins, 367 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966) (district court justified in finding murder conviction
lacked fundamental fairness where both defendants confessed and both confessions were admit-
ted without redacting references to other codefendants); Creenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d
962 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (where both codefendants confessed to bank robbery, it is improper to
admit the confessions because there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959)
(sixth amendment violated despite admonition to jury to disregard confession of one defendant
as against codefendant); Hill v. Deegan, 268 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (sixth amendment
violated when confessions of codefendants admitted at joint murder trial despite limiting in-
structions to jury); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946) (where both defend-
ants confess to burglary and prosecution plans to use both confessions at their joint trial, a
severance should be granted); People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E.336 (1928) (Lehman, J.,
dissenting) (convictions should not stand due to inability of jury to disregard incriminating
confessions).
79. See note 10 supra, and notes 81-84 and accompanying text infra, for a discussion of
varying lower court definitions and applications of interlocking confessions.
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ing confessions doctrine, 80 there is very little agreement as to what degree
the admissions must interlock before Bruton is declared inapplicable and the
damaging evidence is admitted. Some courts have limited the doctrine to
those situations in which the two confessions do not contradict each
other. 81 Other courts have limited application of the doctrine to situations
in which the codefendant's confession does not implicate the defendant to
any greater extent than his or her own statement. 82 Still other courts re-
quire that the confessions be only "substantially similar" 8 3 or "dovetail in all
the particulars." 84  The Parker Court has failed to note these lower court
discrepancies and, more importantly, has failed to present its own interpre-
tation of how the doctrine should be applied in future Bruton analyses.
Thus, it is unclear which definition of interlocking confessions, if any, the
Court applied in Parker or will apply in future confessing codefendant
cases. 85
This failure to define interlocking confessions is disturbing in light of the
fact that the mere existence of interlocking confessions will not always
guarantee that their admission will not prejudice a defendant. Situations will
arise in which the confessions only partially interlock or in which one confes-
sion far exceeds the other with respect to incriminating evidence. 86 In-
deed, the Court's failure to define interlocking confessions becomes even
more critical in light of the respondents' argument that their confessions
were not, in fact, corroborative and interlocking. 87
80. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
81. E.g., Jones v. State, 227 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Elliot, 524
S.W.2d 473, 477-78 (Tenn. 1975).
82. E.g., Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
872 (1975); Rachel v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d 395, 399-400 (Ky. App. 1975). See also State
v. Elliot, 524 S.W.2d 473, 477-78 (Tenn. 1975) (if it increases chance of conviction or degree of
offense the non-declarant may be charged with, then the confession may not be entered into
evidence).
83. E.g., United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64, 66 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1911 (1972).
84. E.g., Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207, 208 (10th Cir. 1971).
85. As noted by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, the plurality does not discuss
how the confessions interlock but "simply assumes the interlock." 99 S. Ct. at 2142 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
86. For example, suppose prior to joint trial codefendants A and B make separate confes-
sions to a robbery. Codefendant B, however, also states that he and defendant A committed a
multiple murder and car theft during the course of the robbery. There is some evidence that,
indeed, A and B did commit these other crimes. At trial, B does not take the stand, yet his
confession is allowed into evidence under the interlocking confession doctrine. Clearly A is
being prejudiced by the admission of B's confession. He or she is denied the opportunity to
subject B to cross-examination concerning the confession which implicates him or her in the
other crimes. This is disturbing due to the fact that B has a clear motive to shift the blame.
Defendant A is being denied the very right the confrontation clause and Bruton were designed
to protect-the right to confront his or her accuser, B.
87. Brief for Respondents at 34-40, Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Respondents]. The respondents argued that, in particular, respondent Hamil-
ton's confession did not corroborate many important details in the other confessions:
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A Confessing Defendant Reduces His Right
to Confront Witnesses Against Him
The plurality sought to distinguish Parker from Bruton by pointing out
that the respondents in Parker confessed, whereas the complaining defend-
ant in Bruton maintained his innocence from the start.88 As observed by
dissenting Justice Stevens, however, this declaration seems to limit the ap-
plication of Bruton doctrine to the "largely irrelevant set of facts in the case
that announced it." 89  Justice Rehnquist responded to that contention by
stating that the facts in Bruton were far from irrelevant and that the Bruton
doctrine is a narrow exception to the general rule. 90 It is questionable,
however, whether Bruton was meant to apply only to situations in which the
complaining defendant has maintained his or her innocence from the start.
In fact, as noted earlier, five of the fourteen cases relied upon by the Bruton
Court involved interlocking confessions. 91
Although in most cases a defendant's confession is so convincing and reli-
able that a Bruton error would be harmless, 92 many confessions are not as
reliable as the plurality suggests. Confessions often are tainted by physical
coercion, 93 trickery and deceit, 94 or are a result of other coercive police
Nowhere in Hamilton's statement read to the jury is there any mention of a plan
"to rob" the poker game. Nor does the statement show that he or any of the "two
other partes" had any kind of weapons at the scene or received any money thereaf-
terwards for their involvement. The statement doesn't even say that they entered
the apartment. Therefore, assuming arguendo, that Hamilton's statement could be
considered against him in a separate trial, there would not have been that degree of
evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt" to have convicted him of "murder in the
perpetration of a robbery."
id. at 34-35.
The respondents also argued that Pickens' confession, which was tainted due to a Miranda
violation, was by far the most detailed concerning the planning and execution of the robbery
and that the jury probably could not have distinguished one confession from another. Id. at 38.
Respondents argued that, undoubtedly, the jury filled the gaps in some confessions with the
information contained in the other confessions. Id.
88. 99 S. Ct. at 2140.
89. Id. at 2146. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2140 n.7.
91. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
93. E.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (beating confession out of suspect
with rubber hose); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (confession extracted from suspect
through combination of physical abuse and intensive interrogation); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936) (confession produced by tying rope around suspect's neck, hanging him from a tree limb,
and repeatedly whipping him until he admitted guilt).
94. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (police officer who was close friend of
suspect extracted confession by telling suspect that if he did not receive a confession from
suspect, he would lose his job); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (state psychiatrist, posing
as a "doctor" employed to treat suspect, induced suspect to confess through subtle and sugges-
tive questioning). See also C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 140 (2d
ed. 1970); C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 165 (1978).
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tactics. 95 Also, it is widely recognized that at joint trial, a codefendant's
confession is inevitably suspect due to the tendency to shift blame onto
others. 96
Justice Rehnquist noted that when a defendant allows his own confession
to stand unchallenged before the jury, the right to cross-examine his or her
codefendant would be of little value. 97 Justice Rehnquist's statement im-
plies that the defendants on trial in Parker forfeited their right to impeach
adverse witnesses simply because they chose to exercise their fifth amend-
ment right not to testify. This implication is inexcusable as it is well estab-
lished that no one should be penalized for exercising a constitutional
right. 98 It is also well established that failure to take the stand to refute
incriminating evidence does not enhance the reliability of that evidence.
This principle is demonstrated by cases in which a prosecutor has been pro-
hibited from instructing the jury that it may properly infer guilt from a de-
fendant's failure to testify. 99 Therefore, the fact that the defendants in
95. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (intimidating thirty-three year
old mental defective into confessing); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (taking advantage
of poor education of suspect to trick suspect into confessing); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944) (eliciting confession by continuously questioning suspect for thirty-six hours without
rest or sleep); Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945) (confession result of threats
to give suspect the "Chicago treatment" whereby one is handcuffed, hung over a door, and
beaten until he produces a satisfactory admission). See also F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 62 (2d ed. 1967), which depicts the "friendly-unfriendly"
routine whereby one officer harasses and abuses the suspect while the other officer pretends to
be the suspect's friend and promises to help the suspect by getting the vicious officer off his
back if he confesses to the crime. For a further discussion on the reliability of confessions see
Foster, Confessions and the Station House Syndrome, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 683 (1969).
It should be noted that both respondents Hamilton and Randolph testified outside the pre-
sence of the jury that they were subjected to physical abuse and not advised of their rights
during the interrogations which led to their confessions. Brief for Respondents, supra note 87,
at 32. Respondent Hamilton also testified that he had a third grade education and could not
read or write. Id. Yet, the police were able to extract a written confession from Hamilton which
was not produced at trial. Id. For the details regarding the voluntariness of respondent Pickens'
confession see note 42 supra.
96. See Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2139 (1979); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 136 (1968); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); Crawford v. United
States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909); Stoneking v. United States, 232 F.2d 385, 388-89 (8th Cir.
1956). It is difficult to perceive how a confession which shifts blame onto an accomplice does not
prejudice that accomplice. This is particularly true where one accomplice inculpates the other in
excess of the other's own confession. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
97. 99 S. Ct. at 2139. Justice Rehnquist noted that: "Successfully impeaching a codefend-
ant's confession on cross-examination would likely yield small advantage to the defendant
whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged." id. (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), in which the Court struck
down as unconstitutional a statutory clause which, in effect penalized a defendant for exercising
his right to trial by jury. The clause held that a defendant charged with kidnapping, who chose
to demand his right to jury trial, would risk the death penalty; however, if he abandoned his
right to contest his guilt before a jury and pleaded guilty, he would be assured that he would
not be executed.
99. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), discussed in note 65 supra.
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Parker failed to testify in their own defense should not have been used to
justify denying them their sixth amendment confrontation rights.
Juries Are Again Capable of
Performing "Mental Gymnastics" 100
The plurality places great emphasis on the reliability of jury instructions
and their role as the foundation of the system of jury trials. 101 Tradition-
ally, jurors have been presumed capable of following court instructions to
disregard prejudicial evidence in the form of hearsay, 102 improper out-
bursts, 103 volunteered prejudicial comments, 104 and material which is later
withdrawn from evidence. 105 The presumption that juries can perform
these mental gymnastics, however, is precisely what Bruton "effectively re-
pudiated." 106 The essence of a Bruton analysis is that juries are not capable
of ignoring certain prejudicial evidence. 107 The argument of jury compe-
tence advanced by the plurality in Parker was the very same argument that
was advanced and lost by the government in Bruton. 108
100. In Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932), Judge Learned Hand severely
criticized the proposition that a jury may be presumed capable of disregarding inadmissible
hearsay evidence. He wrote that the limiting instruction is a "recommendation to the jury of a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else [sic]." Id. at 1007
(emphasis added). The Bruton Court, in overruling the Delli Paoli presumption that juries are
capable of ignoring prejudicial evidence, adopted Judge Hand's eloquent criticism of that pre-
sumption. United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 132, 132 n.8 (1968). In Parker, however, the
Court appears to have resurrected the Delli Paoli presumption of jury ability, thereby indicating
that juries, once again, are presumed capable of performing mental gymnastics.
101. 99 S. Ct. at 2139. The plurality stated that: "A crucial assumption underlying that sys-
tem of jury trial contemplated by the Constitution is that juries will follow the instructions given
them by the trial judge." Id.
102. E.g., United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831
(1974); People v. Burke, 549 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1976).
103. E.g., Davis v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); State v. Spaulding,
288 N.C. 397, 219 S.E.2d 178 (1975).
104. E.g., Johnson v. State, 121 Ga. App. 477, 174 S.E.2d 246 (1970); People v. Killebrew,
61 Mich. App. 129, 232 N.W.2d 329 (1975); State v. Christie, 91 N.J. Super. 420, 221 A.2d 20
(1966).
105. E.g., State v. Wing, 455 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
106. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated that: "The basic premise of Delli Paoli was that it is 'reasonably possible for the
jury to follow' sufficiently clear instructions to disregard the confessor's extrajudicial statement
that this codefendant participated with him in the crime .... But since Deli Paoli was decided,
the Court has effectively repudiated its basic premise." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Indeed, the whole purpose of Bruton is to shield juries from becoming prejudiced be-
cause a jury is unable to segregate evidence into "separate intellectual boxes." Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. at 131, quoting People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P.2d 265, 272, 47
Cal. Rptr. 353, 360 (1965). This reading of Bruton is further supported by the cases holding that
the Bruton doctrine is inapplicable in non-jury trials. See, e.g., Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413
F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969); Brown v. State, 252 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
108. Memorandum for the United States at 7-8, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968). The Court responded to this argument by noting:
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Not only are jury instructions likely to be ineffective 10 9 but also they may
accomplish the opposite of what the court is seeking to achieve. It has been
argued that the instructions will recall the confession to the jury's attention
and thereby guarantee that the jury will improperly use the confession to
determine the guilt of the non-statement maker. 110
An additional consideration not directly addressed by the Court is the
probable impact of the confessions on the jurors' minds. I" The sixth circuit
undertook this consideration and analyzed Parker as if each defendant had
been in a separate trial. It found that the jury would not have been able,
The basic premise of Delli Paoli was that it is "reasonably possible for the jury to
follow" sufficiently clear instructions to disregard the confessor's extrajudicial state-
ment that his codefendant participated with him in committing the crime. 352 U.S.
at 239. If it were true that the jury disregarded the reference to the codefendant no
question would arise under the Confrontation Clause, because by hypothesis the
case is treated as if the confessor made no statement inculpating the non-confessor.
But since Delli Paoli was decided the Court has effectively repudiated its basic
premise.
391 U.S. at 126.
Indeed, as Justice Stevens notes in his Parker dissent, the plurality resurrects Delli Paoli, 352
U.S. 232 (1957), and Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947), which are the very cases that
Bruton overruled, to support its contention that juries are presumed to disregard the extrajudicial
confession of the nontestifying codefendant. 99 S. Ct. at 2147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 216 (2d Cir. 1966); Nash v. United States, 54
F.2d 1006, 1006-07 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.
2d 518, 525-27, 407 P.2d 265, 269-70, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 357-58 (1965); State v. Young, 46 N.J.
152, 156-58, 215 A.2d 352, 355-56 (1965). For a general discussion of the efficacy of jury instruc-
tions see Comment, Post Conspiracy Admissions in Joint Prosecutions-Effectiveness of Instruc-
tions Limiting the Use of Evidence to One Co-Defendant, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 713 (1957);
Note, Admissibility of Codefendant Admissions in Joint Trials, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 306 (1967);
49 MINN. L. REv. 360 (1964); 74 YALE L.J. 553 (1965). See also Broeder, The University of
Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Broeder], in which tape
recordings of mock trials involving damage claims were played before three groups of thirty
juries. One group heard the defendant and asked if he had liability insurance whereupon he
answered "no." The second group heard the same question to which the defendant answered
"yes." The third group heard the question, the affirmative response, an objection by counsel,
and an instruction by the judge to disregard the answer. The group which heard the defendant
deny having liability insurance awarded an average of $33,000 to the plaintiff. The group which
heard the defendant admit having liability insurance awarded an average of $37,000. The third
group, which heard the defendant disclose that he had insurance and the judge's subsequent
limiting instructions to disregard the answer, produced an average award of $46,000. Professor
Broeder concludes that clearly juries do not overlook potentially damaging evidence despite a
direct instruction to do so. Id. at 754.
110. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
Broeder, supra note 109, in which Professor Broeder concludes that not only do jurors ignore
the limiting instructions but they are sensitized by them and proceed to increase the award
accordingly. Professor Broeder notes that when the jury was sensitized by the instruction it
increased the award from an average of $37,000 to $46,000. Broeder, supra note 109, at 754.
111. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asked whether it is realistic to assume that the
jury did indeed disregard the instruction and suggested that Bruton clearly indicates that the
jurors are unable to do so. 99 S. Ct. at 2147 (Stevens, J., dissenting)..
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beyond a reasonable doubt, to render the same guilty verdict if each confes-
sion bad been weighed independent of the other confessions. 112 This ad-
mittedly speculative analysis was the same one used in Schneble v.
Florida, 113 in which the extrajudicial confessions of two codefendants were
admitted into evidence. 114 There, however, the Court found that the prob-
able impact of the admitted confessions on the jurors' minds was negligi-
ble. 115 The importance of this consideration is highlighted by the respon-
dents' argument in Parker that the major evidence of a plan to commit the
robbery1 16 came from respondent Pickens' confession-a confession tainted
by the denial of right to counsel. 117 Indeed, the respondents maintained
112. 575 F.2d 1180, 1183 (6th Cir. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in part, 99 S. Ct. 2132
(1979). The sixth circuit argued that:
It is important to point out the factors which might affect a jury's verdict in relation
to these three defendants in separate trials where the Bruton rule was observed:
1) Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were not involved in the gambling game be-
tween Douglas, the Las Vegas gambler, and Robert Wood the hometown gam-
bler who got cheated.
2) They were not involved in originating the plan for recouping Robert Wood's
losses.
3) They were not in the room (and had not been) when Robert Wood killed Doug-
las.
4) Indeed, the jury could conclude from the admissible evidence in this case that
when Joe Wood pulled out his pistol, the original plan for three "unknown"
blacks [the respondents] to rob the all-white poker game was aborted and that
petitioners' subsequent entry into the room did not involve them in the crime of
murder.
Additionally, if we return to the consideration of the joint trial, that jury as
charged by the state court judge had the responsibility of determining whether or
not any of the three confessions testified to by Memphis police was voluntarily
given. Assuming that two of the three confessions had been removed from jury
consciousness by adherence to Bruton, we find it impossible to conclude that the
jury finding and ultimate verdict would, "beyond reasonable doubt," have been the
same.
Id. at 1182-83.
113. 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
114. Id. at 428. See note 65 supra.
115. Id. at 432. The Court noted that it needed to
determine on the basis of "our own reading of the record and on what seems to us
to have been in probable impact . . . on the minds of an average jury," Harrington
v. California [citation omitted], whether Snell's admissions were sufficiently preju-
dicial to petitioner as to require reversal .... Thus, unless there is a reasonable
possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, re-
versal is not required .... In this case, we conclude that the "minds of an average
jury" would not have found the State's case significantly less persuasive had the
testimony as to Snell's admissions been excluded.
Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
116. It was essential that the state showed this plan in order to convict the respondents of
murder under the felony-murder doctrine. See note 35 supra for a more complete discussion of
the felony-murder rule.
117. Appendix, supra note 34, at 32-38. See note 42 supra for respondent Pickens' confes-
sion.
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that if each confession had been weighed separately, a juror might have
logically concluded that the Wood brothers planned the robbery, murder
themselves, and sought to "set up" the respondents. 118 The assumption
that the jury disregarded these confessions when determining the guilt of
each individual becomes even weaker in light of the fact that the jury was
apprised of the government's theory of the case at the beginning of the trial
and subsequently the jury was charged with the responsibility of determin-
ing whether the confessions were voluntary. 119
IMPACT
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court has solved the lower court conflict over
whether or not Bruton applies to situations involving interlocking confes-
sions. Presumably, the Bruton doctrine does not apply to cases in which the
complaining defendant has confessed and his or her confession "interlocks"
with that of the codefendant. This is not very instructive, however, as the
Court has failed to define interlocking confessions. It remains unclear to
what degree the confessions must "interlock" before Bruton is declared in-
applicable. 120 Thus, the lower court conflict is likely to remain unresolved.
The courts which previously employed the interlocking confession exception
to Bruton errors may continue to do so relying on the Parker decision. The
courts which previously rejected the blanket application of this per se excep-
tion may also continue to do so simply by labeling the confessions non-
interlocking. Indeed, the plurality's failure to define interlocking confessions
may suggest that the Bruton rule is now only applicable to those situations
in which the complaining defendant has made no inculpatory statements. 121
The Parker analysis appears superfluous in view of the existing harmless
error Bruton analysis. That is, the harmless error approach already encom-
passes those situations in which the evidence presented against the com-
plaining defendant is so overwhelming that the possible prejudice resulting
from the admission of his or her codefendant's co'nfession may not be devas-
tating to the defendant's case. 122 Indeed, in his concurring opinion Justice
Blackmun stated that, at best, the adoption of the Parker analysis only im-
poses an additional step to the harmless error analysis. 123 Yet, there is a
118. Brief for Respondents, supra note 87, at 9.
119. See note 112 supra.
120. Indeed, Justice Blackmun notes in his concurring opinion that it is unclear where the
new analysis will lead the courts since the plurality does not indicate precisely what constitutes
an "interlocking confession." 99 S. Ct. at 2142 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121. This interpretation of Parker is supported by the fact that the only distinction the plural-
ity made between Parker and Bruton was that in Bruton the complaining defendant made no
incriminating statements. 99 S. Ct. at 2140.
122. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra for the discussion of the harmless error
approach.
123. Justice Blackmun wrote that before making a harmless error determination, the courts




key difference between the two analyses which suggests that the Parker rule
is not merely superfluous and will impose more than an innocuous additional
step.
Under the harmless error approach, the courts are granted a degree of
flexibility denied under the per se rule declaring the Bruton rule inapplica-
ble. As previously noted, certain situations will arise in which, although the
confessions somehow interlock, the complaining codefendant might still be
prejudiced. 124 Under the harmless error approach, the courts have been
able to apply Bruton in the above situation and weigh the damage done to
the complaining defendant to determine whether the judgment should
stand. Under the new Parker analysis, however, the courts will be locked
into an analysis automatically rejecting the application of Bruton, regardless
of the damage done. 125
At best, in addition to the apparent resolution of the lower court confusion
over the admissibility of interlocking confessions, the Parker analysis will
refocus attention on the nature of the confessions themselves. Courts will be
forced to first gauge whether or not the confessions intertwine sufficiently to
be termed interlocking. Theoretically if one confession is far more in-
criminating than the other 126 or increases the degree of the offense with
which the non-declarant may be charged, 127 the court should not deem
them to be interlocking. As evidenced by the various courts which employ
their own version of the interlocking confession doctrine, 128 however, not all
courts will use this rigorous a test to determine whether a confession is
interlocking. Therefore, it is unlikely that Parker will induce the lower
courts to more closely scrutinize the nature of interlocking confessions.
124. See note 86 and accompanying text supra. See also the following hypothetical created by
Justice Stevens to illustrate the potential damage done to a confessing codefendant's case once
the Bruton protection is stripped away.
Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that defendant X
and codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The first is the tape of
a televised interview with Y describing in detail how he and X planned and exe-
cuted the crime. Items two through nine involve circumstantial evidence of a past
association between X and Y, a shared hostility for the victim, and an expressed
wish for his early demise-evidence that in itself might very well be insufficient to
convict X. Item 10 is the testimony of a drinking partner, a former cellmate, or a
divorced spouse of X who vaguely recalls X saying that he had been with Y at the
approximate time of the killing. Neither X or Y takes the stand.
If Y's televised confession were placed before the jury while Y was immunized
from cross-examination, it would undoubtedly have the "devastating" effect on X
that the Bruton rule was designed to avoid.
99 S. Ct. at 2145 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. For an example of a court reluctantly following the interlocking confession doctrine see
Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
126. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra.
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A BETTER APPROACH
The simplest and arguably the most obvious solution to the problem of
how to preserve the confrontation rights of non-testifying confessing
codefendants would be to grant a severance, upon request, when the pros-
ecutor indicates he or she will use the confession at joint trial and such use
will prejudice the rights of the codefendants. This device is provided for in
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 129  A moving defend-
ant, however, is rarely granted a severance130 because under the current
interpretation of Rule 14, the defendant is burdened with showing that join-
der would be prejudicial. 131 Also, since there are no written standards for
granting or denying severence, 132 the severance matter is entirely within
the discretion of the trial judge133 and his or her decision is irreversible
129. In Bruton, the Court intimated that the recent 1966 Amendment to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure favored granting severance instead of introducing the inculpating confes-
sion of a codefendant at joint trial. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131-32 (1968). The
proposed amendment to Rule 14, effective July 1, 1966, reads as follows:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sever-
ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires (emphasis
added).
FED. R. CsuM. P. 14. In making its proposal for the amendment of Rule 14, the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules stated:
A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence against a codefend-
ant of a statement or confession made by that codefendant. This prejudice cannot
be dispelled by cross-examination if the codefendant does not take the stand. Limit-
ing instructions to the jury may not in fact erase the prejudice ...
The purpose of the amendment is to provide a procedure whereby the issue of
possible prejudice can be resolved on the motion for severance. The judge may
direct the disclosure of the confessions or statements of the defendants to him for in
camera inspection as an aid to determining whether the possible prejudice justifies
ordering separate trials.
34 F.R.D. 411, 419 (1964).
130. See Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958). See also Walsh, Fair
Trials and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 49 A.B.A.J. 853, 856-57 (1963); Note,
Joinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 513, 535 (1967).
131. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62,
67 (3d Cir. 1966). The burden of showing prejudice is quite heavy as courts generally require
more than the "appearance" of prejudice." See United States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597, 599-601
(3d Cir. 1969); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1948); United States v.
Steel, 38 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131
(1968) (severance granted upon clear showing that defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial);
United States v. Lev, 22 F.R.D. 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (severance granted only upon a clear
cut showing of prejudice); United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442, 457-58 (M.D. Pa. 1958)
(severance granted only upon showing of prejudice the type which a trial court cannot protect
against).
132. Rule 14 merely states that severance is allowable if justice requires. FED. R. CrIM. P.
14.
133. United States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Mesarosh, 13
F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
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absent a showing of abuse of discretion. 134 The justification for placing
these barriers before a moving defendant is that there is a substantial public
interest in having joint trials which far outweighs the potential prejudice the
defendant might suffer. 135
A better approach to severance is the "sever or exclude" rule, wherein the
judge must grant severance when the prosecutor wishes to introduce a
codefendant's confession which implicates another codefendant. 136 This
method is advocated by some courts, 137 various commentators, 138 the
American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Criminal Trials, 139 and
the state of Wisconsin. 140 Although granting severance will impose a strain
134. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62,
67 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Gardner, 347 F.2d 405, 406 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Miller, 340 F.2d 421, 423 (4th Cir. 1965).
135. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968) (joint trials conserve funds, lessen
inconvenience to government and witnesses and avoid delays); Haggard v. United States, 369
F.2d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1966) (Rule 14 is to be given broad interpretation so as to effect the
more efficient administration of criminal trials); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st
Cir. 1966) (possible small prejudice to defendant tolerable due to comparatively greater benefit
to court); Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 744 (1948) (joint trial increases speed and
efficiency in administration of justice). See also WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
457 (1967).
136. Of course if a codefendant's confession may be redacted such that it in no way implicates
the other codefendants then there is no need for a severance. For example, if the confession
was redacted such that it contained no mention of the other parties involved in the crime and
did not use any first person plural pronouns, the other codefendants could by no stretch of the
imagination be prejudiced. See note 15 supra for a more complete discussion of redaction.
137. See Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
923 (1965), and Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in which the court
indicated that separate trials would be required if the prosecutor desired to use the confession
of one codefendant at joint trial.
138. See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), for
the following suggested formula:
When several defendants are on trial for criminal conspiracy, if the government
seeks to put in evidence an out of court statement by one defendant which is hear-
say as to the others (i.e. an out of court statement made after the conspiracy has
terminated), then
(a) unless all references to the other defendants can be effectively deleted (so that
the statement will contain no hint of the others' guilt) and unless those references
are deleted,
(b) the trial judge must (1) refuse to admit the statement or (2) sever the trial of
those other defendants (emphasis added).
Id. at 324 (Frank, J., dissenting). See also Singer, Admissibility of Confessions of Codefendants,
60 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 195, 203 (1965); Comment, Nelson v. Oeil: Severance as a Remedy
for Bruton Errors, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 111, 125 (1972); Comment, The Right of Confrontation and
the Use of Non-Testifying Codefendants'Confessions: Constitutional Law in a Microcosm, 26 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 755, 776 (1972); Duke Note, supra note 27, at 347-50.
139. A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.3 (1967).
140. See WisC. STAT. § 971.12(3) 1969 which provides that: "The district attorney shall ad-
vise the court prior to trial if he intends to use the statement of a codefendant which implicates
another defendant in the crime charged. Thereupon, the judge shall grant a severance as to any
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on the resources of an already over-burdened judicial system, it will at the
same time promote efficiency by avoiding retrials, misjoined cases, and
numerous appeals. 141 It also will promote efficiency by eliminating both
the need to subject the various confessions to redaction and the need to
determine whether the confessions interlock.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the interlocking confession analysis is the logical result of
the Court's developing attitude toward Bruton errors. That is, the Court has
departed from the apparently simple question of whether or not a defendant
has been denied the right to confront a witness against him or her. Rather,
it has adopted an analysis which gauges the sufficiency of evidence against a
complaining codefendant before determining whether his or her confronta-
tion rights have been violated. In cases like Frazier, 142 Harrington, 143 and
Dutton, 144 the Court first began to declare certain denials of confrontation
harmless due to the degree of incriminating evidence accumulated against
the defendant. The Court subsequently has employed this "sufficiency of
evidence" outlook to formulate a per se rule excluding application of Bruton
to situations in which a defendant has produced "the most probative and
damaging evidence against him" 14 5 -a confession. This sufficiency of evi-
dence trend is disturbing not only because it limits the application of the
Bruton doctrine to cases closely paralleling the Bruton set of facts, 146 but
also because the system of joint trials already compromises the rights of
codefendants. 147
Lance J. Rogers
such defendant." Ohio has also moved in this direction by requiring separate trials in capital
cases, unless good cause can be shown for joinder. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.20 (Page).
141. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 635 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
143. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
144. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
145. Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2139 (1979), quoting Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 139 (White, J., dissenting).
146. See notes 89, 90, and accompanying text supra. It is somewhat ironic to note that de-
fendant Bruton himself might not have withstood this sufficiency of evidence scrutiny, as he had
been identified at trial by an eyewitness to the robbery. 99 S. Ct. at 2146 n.7 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
147. Although often praised as an efficient means of dealing with the problems of undue
delay, cost, and inconsistent verdicts, the joint trial has been severely criticized for compromis-
ing the rights of the codefendants. Duke Note, supra note 27, at 330; Note, Bruton v. United
States: A Belated Look at the Warren Court Concept of Criminal Justice, 44 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
54, 59-60 (1969); 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1112, 1115 (1956); 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 356, 359 (1967); 36
U. CIN. L. REV. 306, 306-07 (1967).
There is the additional risk that juries will tend to find one defendant guilty by association
with his codefendant. See Note, Codefendant's Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROB-
LEMS 80, 81 (1967). Also, as most trials are conspiracy cases, there exists the risk that the jury
will imply the crucial element of intent from the maelstrom of witnesses, confessions, and hear-
say evidence. See Duke Note, supra note 27, at 330.
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